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MEETING THE DEMAND FOR INFORMATIVE

ANNUAL REPORTS TO STOCKHOLDERS

By Leonard M. Savoie
Executive Vice President
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

During the past several years considerable criti

cism has been leveled at business on the score of its

annual reports to stockholders.

The criticism has not

concerned the quality of design and typography, or of
charts and four-color photographs.

Although these features

of reports may have become counterproductive through over
use, it is the financial statements which are the target.

Blame is directed not only at managements but also at the

accounting profession for not imposing stricter reporting
rules.

It is not the purpose of this article to rehearse
the criticisms nor to assess their validity.

Rather, the

purpose is to show that there has been progress in corporate

financial reporting and that, in total, it is impressive.
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As in many other areas, however, progress here
has resulted from a series of moves.

The effect on an

observer, therefore, is like that from watching the hands
of a clock:

there seems to be little or no movement unless

one compares positions over a fairly extended period.

This article will examine the progress achieved
in the period between the wayward Twenties and now; much

of this progress has been brought about by the SEC, some
by corporate financial executives, and a great deal by

the accounting profession.

The article also will indicate

some of the areas in which further improvement is in order.

In 1926 William Z. Ripley, a professor of eco

nomics at Harvard, caused a stir with a bristling attack

in The Atlantic Monthly on the inadequacy of corporate
financial reporting of that era.

To illustrate the atti

tude of some managements, Ripley cited a paragraph from the
annual report of a company he did not identify:

The settled plan of the directors

has been to withhold information from the
stockholders and others that is not called
for by the stockholders in a body.

So far

no-request for information has been made in
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the manner prescribed by the directors.

Distribution of stock has not meant
distribution of control.

After describing deficiencies in other annual
reports, resulting presumably from the same sort of think
ing, Ripley wrote:

"Stockholders are entitled to adequate

information and the State and the general public have a
right to the same privilege."

There were others who shared Ripley’s concern
about the "limitless obfuscation" of financial reporting

in the Twenties.

Among them were some leading certified

public accountants who suggested to the New York Stock

Exchange that the accounting profession and the Exchange
collaborate in drawing up reporting standards for listed
companies.
The proposal brought no action at the time.

But

with the Crash and ensuing Great Depression, attitudes
changed, and new discussions between the Exchange and the
accounting profession culminated in 1934 in publication of
"Audits of Corporate Accounts."

This proved to be a seminal document.

Not only

did it set forth principles to be followed in financial

reporting, it also led to the first standard form of

-4-

auditor’s report and to a requirement that the financial

statements of companies applying for listing with the
Exchange be independently audited.
In this same year -- 1934 -- Congress created
the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Perhaps taking a

cue from the arrangement worked out by the CPAs and the

Stock Exchange, the SEC required that companies under its
jurisdiction be audited by independent public accountants.

While the Securities Exchange Act empowered the
SEC to prescribe accounting practices for publicly held
companies, the Commission made known that it expected the

accounting profession itself to assume the main burden of
rule-setting.

Accordingly, the American Institute of

Certified Public Accountants formed a Committee on Account
ing Procedure to bring more consistency to corporate

reporting and to discourage undesirable

practices.

One of the Committee’s first efforts was to

restrict the writing up, on balance sheets, of fixed assets

that had appreciated.

It was not uncommon in the Twenties

for companies to write up plants and properties to appraised

values, and in some instances the increments were substan
tial.

Whereas today’s investor generally gives more weight

to income statements than to balance sheets when evaluating
companies, the reverse was true in the Twenties and Thirties

-5-

so the writing up of fixed assets had substantial impact

Moreover, the practice could be highly

on stock prices.

misleading since management's were not likely to order new

appraisals of physical assets when the economy dipped and
the assets would have to be written down. 1

In 1940 the Committee on Accounting Procedure

issued a bulletin that fixed assets should normally be

stated at cost.

Further, in cases where companies had

booked assets at appreciated values on their balance sheets,

income should be charged with depreciation computed on the
new higher values.
Also in 1940, the Committee on Accounting Procedure

recommended that income statements and balance sheets in .

annual reports to stockholders should be given not just
for the year under review but for the prior year

as well.

Thus investors would have a benchmark for judging current

performance.

In the course of time, comparative presenta

tion of financial statements to stockholders became virtually
standard practice and, in 1967, the SEC ruled that companies

subject to its proxy rules had to include comparative state
ments in their annual reports.

1The SEC, from its beginning, would not accept financial
statements in which fixed assets were stated at appreciated
values.
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For the same purpose of providing investors with

indications of trends, the annual reports of most major
corporations today include tables of "highlights” covering
five to ten years or more.

Neither the SEC nor the account

ing profession specifies that this information be in annual
reports, although the SEC does require that a summary of

earnings for at least five years be included in registration

statements and has recently extended the requirement to
other reports filed with the Commission.

Even though the SEC requirement does not apply to
annual reports to stockholders, many companies apparently

have decided that highlight figures for a number of years
are useful to stockholders and, as a result, the rank-and-

file investor today is provided with a range of data that
would have been unthinkable to earlier generations of
management.

In 1971 it is hard to believe that in annual
reports of thirty or forty years ago the volume of a com

pany’s sales and the cost of sales were often not disclosed.

But the fact is that many managements gave only a net profit
figure.

Their explanation, or rationalization, was that to

reveal sales volumes and costs would be to give weapons to

competitors.2

similar argument is sometimes used still to block proposals
A
2
for improved reporting, especially proposals for presenting
operating results for separate lines of business.
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The SEC from its earliest days required disclosure

of sales and cost of sales in filings.

This requirement was

challenged during the Thirties when the American Sumatra

Tobacco Company asked that it be exempted from disclosure

in a filing it was making.
the company brought suit.

The SEC denied the request, and

The decision by the court that

heard the case, handed down in 1940, upheld the Commission,
and since then the reporting of sales and cost of sales has

become generally accepted — i.e., practically universal —
practice.

In years past it was not unusual to see annual

reports in which a charge was made against income to pro
vide some kind of contingency reserve.

The presumed con

tingency might be only tenuously related to events of the
period being reported or, indeed, highly conjectural.
The reserve against it, however, made possible an
understatement of income for one period and, by being taken

back into income subsequently, an overstatement in a later
period.

In this way, reported income could be made to

reflect not the true course of the company’s fortunes but
arbitrary decisions by management.
In 1947 the Committee on Accounting Procedure

called for an end to charging income to provide reserves

against contingencies which were vague or not reasonably
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related to current operations, declaring that if a contin

gency reserve was set up, it should be created by appro
priation from earned surplus.
Over a span of two decades the Committee on

Accounting Procedure issued fifty-one bulletins, of which
those described above are just a sample of the more impor
tant.

Although the bulletins were only recommendations of

preferred accounting methods and were not binding on members
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,

they were accepted and followed so generally that their
influence on corporate reporting was far-reaching.

In light of a widening investing public and of

innovations in business, the American Institute in 1959
formed the Accounting Principles Board (APB) to carry on
the work of the former Committee on Accounting Procedure

more intensively and with greater research resources.
At the outset, the APB addressed itself to ques

tions of accounting philosophy,
a course which a number of

persons both inside and outside the profession considered
an unwise diversion of effort.

In any event, the Board did

not issue the first of its pronouncements, which are termed
"Opinions," until 1962.

Opinion

1 set guidelines for the

handling of several important aspects of depreciation.
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Provision in the Revenue Act of 1962 of an
"investment credit” to stimulate capital outlays by busi

ness raised a problem of accounting which had not been
encountered before.

A good theoretical case could be made

for regarding the credit as a reduction in current tax

liability (leading to recognition of the full credit in a

single year) or for regarding it as a reduction in the cost
of the purchased equipment (leading to spreading of the
benefit over the equipment ’s life).

The APB took the position that, while either
method could be justified, it was not logical to accept

both the "flow-through” and ’’spreading” methods as alterna
tives.

Opinion 2 therefore specified ’’spreading" as the

only acceptable accounting treatment.

Soon thereafter,

however, the SEC announced it would accept corporate finan

cial statements using either of the two treatments, and the

APB, with the ground cut out from under it, rescinded
Opinion 2.

Opinion 3, issued in 1963, declared that a state

ment of source and application of funds was desirable in

corporate annual reports as "supplementary information."
Such statements are useful to investors in that they plainly
bring out financial information that can be extracted from
the income statement and balance sheet with difficulty if

at all.
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While Opinion 3 merely recommended funds state

ments, Opinion 18, issued this year, holds that such a

statement is a necessary accompaniment of an income state
ment and a balance sheet in making "fair presentation” of
a company’s accounts in an annual report.

Opinion 18 also lists the items that should go

into a funds statement., thereby stymieing attempts to divert
attention from net income by emphasizing cash flow and pre

senting the latter as net income with depreciation charges
added back.
The APB next turned to preventing the use of

leases to produce financial statements that did not give
an accurate picture.

Back in 1949 the old Committee on

Accounting Procedure had issued a bulletin pointing out

that., under some circumstances., leases were tantamount to
installment purchases.

Therefore, the bulletin said, the

’’leased" property should be included among the lessee’s

assets, with suitable accounting for the corresponding

liabilities and related charges in the income statement.

During the Fifties and Sixties it became increas
ingly common for companies to sell a factory, store, or
warehouse to a purchaser from whom the seller had already
agreed to lease back the property.

In some cases, the

purchaser might be a real estate company formed by the seller
for the sole purpose of carrying out the plan.
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Since the sales price of the property was usually

higher than its original cost less depreciation, the effect
was to transform what had been carried as a balance sheet

asset into revenue on the income statement.

Against this,

the seller would show as expense only the rent paid for
the year.

Opinion 5 prevented reporting gains on sale-and-

leaseback transactions.

Opinion 5 also set criteria for determining
whether a lease should be accounted as an installment
purchase.

Some leases which would not be considered

purchases if the two parties were unrelated, were so
regarded if the parties were related.

For transactions that qualified as bona fide

leases and where the amounts involved were material, finan
cial statements would have to contain enough information

to enable a reader to assess the effect of the commitments
upon the financial position and results of operations, both

present and prospective, of the lessee.

Besides minimum

annual rentals, necessary information might include type
of property leased., obligations assumed or guarantees made,
and provisions such as restrictions on dividends or unusual

options.

In a later Opinion, the APB declared that the
financial statements of a subsidiary company whose principal
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business was to lease property to a parent company or other

affiliates should be consolidated in the parent's accounts.

The purpose of this ruling was to prevent attempts to

improve a company’s credit rating by transferring a mortgaged
property to a subsidiary, thereby removing debt from the

parent company’s books.

Until 1967 one source of noncomparability in
reported earnings, not only as between companies but as

between different years in the same company, was the treat
ment of pension funds.

The number of people embraced by

such plans has increased during the past thirty years from
slightly over 4 million in 1940 to possibly 30 million

today.

With employer payments into the programs amounting

to more than $9 billion annually, variations in accounting
for the costs can have great impact on reported earnings.
The old Committee on Accounting Procedure dealt

with pension costs twice:

one bulletin stated that costs

for past services should not be charged to surplus but to

current and future earnings, and another said that pension
costs should be accounted for on an accrual basis and

according to actuarial computations.
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These were forward steps but still left a great

deal of latitude.

In a year of good earnings, a company

could make a large payment into its pension fund, then if
next year’s earnings were flat or down, payment could be

omitted.

Some of the nation’s largest companies did that

in the 1950s.

If the market value of a fund’s investment

portfolio went up, the appreciation could be considered a sub
stitute for a current payment into the fund.
In 1966 the APB dealt exhaustively with pension
fund accounting.

In Opinion 8 the Board took the position

that when a company adopts a formal pension plan, it assumes
long-term obligations that should not be handled by a series

of ad hoc steps.
The Opinion therefore called for pension charges

against each year’s income according to a consistent pattern.
If a change in actuarial assumptions resulted in a plan’s

having more funds than necessary to meet its liabilities,
the accounting gain could not be taken in a lump but would

have to be spread over a period of years.

Even companies that

did not actually accumulate funds to meet pension requirements
but operated their plans on a pay-as-you-go basis would have

to account for pension expense in the same way as companies
with funded plans.

The Opinion further stated that annual reports
to stockholders should disclose the existence of pension
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funds and how they are funded, the amount of pension cost

for the year, and changes in actuarial assumptions or

accounting methods.
The most appropriate accounting treatment for
extraordinary gains and losses -- those arising from trans

actions outside a company’s regular lines of business -was long a matter of debate among accountants.

The sale

or abandonment of a plant is a good example of an event
which produces a result not attributable to ordinary

operations.
Companies had an option on how they would report

an extraordinary gain or loss.

They could take the amount

into retained earnings or include it in income.

Not un

naturally, there was a tendency to record losses as a

reduction of retained earnings (where most investors,

including fairly sophisticated ones, would pay little

attention to it) and to report gains in the income state

ment.

In the latter case, a company whose earnings from

normal operations were uninspiring might be able to show
a rise in net income more encouraging to investors.
APB Opinion 9 specified that extraordinary gains

and losses must be shown on the income statement.

Companies

reporting such items must show first the net income or loss

from ordinary operations, then the extraordinary gain or

loss, then the sum of the two.

If there is more than one
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extraordinary item, the nature and amounts of each must be
disclosed.

Ever since there has been a broad public interest
in the stock market., there has been a corresponding interest

in earnings-per-share figures.

And for the same length of

time, certified public accountants have been telling the

public not to concentrate single-mindedly on this one

number.

The CPAs have not said that e.p.s. should be

ignored but that there are many other factors to consider

in judging a company’s performance.
Nevertheless, the public, in keeping with the

deep human desire to have simple rules-of-thumb for com
plex matters, continued to be fascinated by earnings per

share.

The figures were mentioned prominently in presi

dent’s letters to stockholders and featured on the business
pages of newspapers.

Of course, insofar as the efforts that have been
described above improved the calculation of net income as

a total figure, they tended to improve also the reliability

of earnings-per-share figures.

But more was needed -- some

guidelines had to be set for the calculation of earningsper-share figures themselves.
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A difficulty, however, was that the only part

of an annual report on which CPAs pass judgment as inde

pendent auditors is the formal financial statements.
And, in keeping with their view as to the limited useful

ness of earnings-per-share figures, CPAs had never called

for them to be included in the formal statements.

Instead,

the e.p.s. numbers appeared in the president’s letter, the

"highlights of the year,” or some other section of an annual

report not subject to auditor’s review.

Sometimes, the

earnings per share thus featured were not ones the auditors

would have approved.
Accordingly Opinion 9, which as described earlier
dealt also with extraordinary items, strongly recommended,
but did not require, that earnings per share be disclosed

in income statements.

Thus the e.p.s. figures would come

within the scope of an auditor’s examination.

The e.p.s. problem was accentuated by the fact

that, in numerous corporate acquisitions in our mergerminded time, payment consisted of a ’’package" of the
acquirer's securities.

Such a package usually contained

some common stock but mostly fixed-income securities (deben
tures or preferred stock) convertible into common at a later

time.

-17-

If the amount of common in the package was rela
tively small in light of the earnings of the company being

acquired, the acquirer could show an immediate rise in
earnings per share.

This was simply because the divisor

applied to the combined net income of the merged companies
had been held down.

In other words, it was possible to

show a rise in earings per share of common stock without

there having been a rise in actual net income.
The full import of a transaction of this kind

could be brought out for the benefit of investors, however.,
by showing the dilutive effect on earnings per share that
would occur if the convertible securities in the package

were exchanged for common.
There are other circumstances in which dilution
could occur, and the APB therefore set detailed rules as

to the classes of securities that are to be included in
the divisor of net earnings., and under what conditions.

The Board not only recommended that earnings-per-share
figures be included in corporate income statements, it said

that there should be a "primary” figure -- namely, one for
which the divisor is outstanding common stock plus securi

ties defined as common stock equivalents -- and a "fully
diluted" figure, which takes into account all the common

that would have to be issued to satisfy all conversion
privileges, warrants, options, and so on.
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The most recent move to make earnings-per-share
figures more helpful to investors is Opinion 15 that

makes inclusion of earnings-per-share figures in income

statements not merely recommended, as in Opinion 9, but
a requisite for an unqualified opinion by a member of the
AICPA.

In the financial affairs of companies, income

taxes are obviously a major factor.

Accounting for them

can involve numerous complexities, and in the past different
companies followed different practices.

A main root of the complexities is that an item

of income or expense may be taxed in a different year from
the one in which it appears in a company’s financial state

ments to stockholders.

A prime example is depreciation.

For purposes of the usual income statement, the

cost of a machine is normally depreciated in equal annual

portions over its estimated useful life.

The Internal

Revenue Code, however, permits a faster write-off, thus

reducing a company's income (and hence its income tax) in
the early years of the machine’s life, and increasing the
tax in the later years.
To assure a fair matching of depreciation charges

with the income tax effects arising from them, the practice
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grew of making charges for taxes against current income,
even though the tax would not be paid until later.

This

practice was encouraged in various pronouncements by the

accounting profession and was made a requirement in 1958.
The problem of appropriately matching tax charges

with income is found also in installment sales.

A company

which makes a sale at a price of $600,000 might be paid in

installments of $200,000 a year but take the full sales
price into revenues for the year the sale is made.

Income tax paid that year would include only the
tax on the gross profit on the first installment received.
If provision for the remaining tax were made by a charge

to deferred taxes, there would be no distortion of net
income.

Not all companies used to make such a charge,

however, with the result that net income was overstated

for the year of the sale and understated in following years
when the remaining tax was actually paid.

Accordingly, in Opinion 11 issued in 1967, the
APB called for "comprehensive allocation" of taxes, which

simply means that full provision for taxes must be made in
the same income statements in which the related income is
reported.

The element of financial reporting that aroused

more criticism from business commentators than probably
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any other concerned the accounting treatment of mergers.
And the effort that led to improvement of merger accounting

provoked argument that was both copious and intense.
Traditionally, a merger was regarded as the pur
chase of one company by another.

Payment might be in cash,

stock., or a combination of the two.

The physical assets.,

and the separately calculable intangible assets, of the

acquired company were assigned values, and these figures

were entered in the appropriate accounts on the books of
the acquirer.
In the large majority of cases, however, the
price paid for the acquired company was higher than the

value of the tangible and identifiable intangible assets..
In other words., the company was worth more as a going

concern than the sum of its parts.
The question of how to account for the excess
was resolved by calling it "goodwill” and entering it on
the asset side of the acquiring company’s balance sheet.

To many people, however, this solution was less
than satisfactory.

Proper accounting requires that all

the costs involved in producing revenue be charged against

that revenue.

Goodwill was part of the cost of an acquired

revenue-generating property, yet it usually would not show

up as a charge against the revenue.

Unlike buildings or
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machinery, it would not give rise to depreciation charges.

And, unlike an intangible asset like a patent, its duration
was not determinable.

It would dangle in the company’s

accounts, unchanged, as long as the company existed.
This dilemma gave rise to another method of merger
accounting.

It was called "pooling” and was based on a con

cept not of the purchase of one company by another but of

a mingling of the two.

Thus the figures in the various

categories of accounts on the books of the two companies
were simply added together.

The assets of the acquired

company were not written up to reflect the price paid by
the acquirer, there was no dangling goodwill, and the merged

concerns were treated as though they had been a single entity
since their beginnings.

Pooling was supportable in theory and had merits
in practice.

It also proved subject to abuse, a fact which

became particularly apparent with the growth of conglomera
tion.
Since, for example, the accounts of two companies
were simply added together, the assets of an acquired com

pany appeared on the books of the merged organization at
original cost, not at what the acquirer had paid.

If one

of the assets were then sold, the difference between orig

inal cost and the price received could be counted as profit.
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To make the illustration specific, a company might issue
stock valued at $10 million to buy another company with

a book value of $5 million, operate the acquired business
at a loss, sell it for $7 million, and record a profit of

$2 million.

Moreover, under the concept that the merged com

panies had been one since their origins, Company A which
had operated at a loss for the past year might acquire

Company B, which had earned a healthy profit, and, even
if the merger occurred after the close of the year but

before the annual report was issued, Company A could
announce a profit for the year as a whole.

Last year the APB adopted rules for merger
accounting which retain boththe purchase and pooling

methods but spell out the conditions under which one method
or the other must be applied.

The planned sale of assets

acquired in poolings is curtailed, and the inclusion in net
income for a given year of the profits of a company pooled

after the close of the year is prohibited.

When mergers

are accounted for as purchases, goodwill now must be amor
tized by charges to income over a period not to exceed

forty years.

These provisions have been

endorsed by the

SEC and the New York and American stock exchanges.
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In the past it was customary for a company that
held stock in others to report in its own income statement

only the dividends received from the investments.

Over

time, another practice known as the "equity method" began
to come into favor with accountants.

Under the previous method, a company owning a
subsidiary or holding enough stock to have significant

influence over another company could raise or lower its
own income by influencing the dividends paid to it.

Thus,

if the owning company’s income from operations was poor in

a given year, a subsidiary’s dividends might be boosted
even though the latter itself had not fared well and the
dividends had to be paid out of earnings of earlier years.

If the subsidiary omitted dividends and sustained a net
loss for the year, the loss did not show in the parent

company’s accounts.3
Under the equity method, however, the owning com

pany takes into its own income statement the entire profit
or loss of the subsidiary.

As far back as 1959 the old Committee on Accounting
Procedure recommended that the equity method be used in

accounting for any subsidiaries left out of consolidation.

---------3The accounting practices referred to here apply only to
subsidiaries whose results are not consolidated with the
parent company’s.
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Seven years later, Opinion 10 of the APB required use of
the equity method for unconsolidated domestic subsidiaries,
and Opinion 19 issued this year extends the requirement to
all unconsolidated subsidiaries; joint ventures and other

holdings representing twenty percent or more of voting
stock in another company.

This will give shareholders in

a parent company a clearer picture of how it is doing not

only as viewed in connection with its consolidated subsi
diaries but in connection with its other significant stock
holdings as well.
The measures that have been discussed in this

article do not provide a complete picture of the progress

that has been made in corporate financial reporting.

They

seem sufficient., however., to demonstrate that major efforts

have been made to supply stockholders with increasing amounts

of useful information and to serve the interest of the
investing public.

But while much has been accomplished;

much remains to be done.

Projects dealing with more than twenty areas of
accounting are presently on the agenda of the APB and in

various stages of research or committee review.
One of these, due for early action, concerns

imputing interest on long-term receivables and payables.
This would apply mainly to purchases and sales of major
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assets, such as a building or a plant, where the seller

takes back a long-term note bearing no interest or an

interest rate significantly lower than the prevailing

rate for a comparable instrument.

Under the proposal, the

sale price and amount of the note would be reduced by cal

culating the present value of the note at an imputed rate

of interest.

This would result in a more realistic

reporting of the principal amount of the long-term receiv
able or payable and of the related interest income or

expense.

Another proposal would limit changes in account
ing methods and standardize the reporting of such changes
when they are made.

Essentially, it would restrict

accounting changes to situations where it can be demon
strated that the new method will provide more useful infor
mation to investors than the former one.

When change is

made, its effect would be reported in the current year,

with the effect on prior years disclosed as supplemental
information.

Among other matters on the Board’s agenda, are
accounting for the purchase and retirement of convertible

debt, standards for interim period reporting, and accounting
for extractive industries.
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The continuing flow of pronouncements from the

accounting profession stirs occasional grumblings that

CPAs seem perversely bent on making business more and more
complicated.
around.

Actually, cause and effect are the other way

It is the increased complexity of business that

makes revised or new accounting practices necessary.

The

accounting methods of a generation ago would be no more
adequate to the needs of present business than the visuallymonitored gauges and manual controls of pre-World War II

factories would be adequate for today’s industrial plants.
The proliferation of rules has led also to a

complaint that the APB has functioned in too prescriptive

a fashion and with too much concern for detail, thereby

fashioning a strait jacket that is unduly restrictive on

both businessmen and CPAs.

It has been urged that, because

of the many judgmental factors in accounting, the APB should

limit itself to the formulation of broad principles, within

which accounting firms and their clients would work out
their own applications.

Implicit in this point of view is a question of

degree.
factors.

Accounting most certainly involves judgmental
It is not a discipline which, at the professional

level, can be learned by rote and practiced mechanically.
But this is not the same as saying that its rules should

be only of a general nature.
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Whereas some business managements and some CPA

firms might be pleased by greater permissiveness in

accounting rules, it is unlikely that the investing public,
security analysts, or legislators would be.

Indeed, a

variety of interpretations of broad concepts has been the

source of much of the discontent with accountancy.

A

suggestion that the organized profession should shun
detailed rule-setting is like suggesting that, since we
have the Ten Commandments, every one should be free to

interpret them in his own way, and the enactment of laws
to regulate behavior is intolerably restrictive.

Criticism of corporate reporting is by no means

a result of sloth on the part of business and the account

ing profession.

On the contrary, the record shows numerous

measures to improve the flow of information to stockholders
and to protect the public from the small minority of
executives who would deliberately mislead.

As is so often

the case, however, progress begets desire for more pro
gress; and desire can easily outpace means of fulfillment.

When a society and, in particular, its business
system are dynamic, the task of keeping accounting practices

in tune with- events is unending.

It is encouraging, there

fore, that a commission has been formed recently to study
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the setting of accounting principles.

Initiated by the

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and
comprised of accountants in public practice, business,

and education, and distinguished persons outside accountancy, it has the mission of appraising the structure and

methods of the Accounting Principles Board and considering
ways of improving the function of establishing accounting

principles.
It would seem that businessmen should not only

cooperate in this study when invited to do so but should

contribute in all practicable ways to the improvement of

financial reporting, in order to undergird the reliability
and social justification of private enterprise management.

